We have photos from the Innovation Festival, from the 7th to the 10th of June in Rome.
The Festival was held in the area surrounding Piazza Augusto Imperatore, and particularly, within the new Ara Pacis Museum complex – work of the internationally renowned architect Richard Meier – a prestigious venue with a high communicative, historical and architectural impact.
The Lazio Region counted with the sponsorship of the Department of Consumer Rights and Simplification of Administrative Procedures as well as the Municipality of Rome to realize this event with thousands of people and raise two main issues: what do we really mean when we talk about innovation? And, are we really sure that innovation is limited to purely technological fields?
The Telematics Freedom Foundation in conjunction with The Winston Smith Project and MG Engineering, showcased a transparent cube to demonstrate the Free Telematics Model.
The cube contained multiple keypad locks (fictitious for the sake of demonstration) to secure the server running the Free Telematic Services and needed to support the Access Policies the foundation is promoting.
To actually control a telematic service, or a web service, a user needs reasonable practical means to verify the software AND the hardware of all servers which run at and beyond the point of decryption of his communications with such service (or “end servers”).
If such “end servers” interact with other external network services, he will know – by having access to the code of the “end servers” – which services, and all the details and conditions of such interactions.
It is not necessary to control servers and networks in between the client device and the “end servers”, as we can reasonably rely on the power of the latest encryption to totally secure from all software, hardware and cables in between. In fact, the communication could be intercepted in between, but the content could not be read. It could be stopped or deviated in between, but there is free software that, installed on both client and server can prevent that, or at least verify that it did happens.
This is not new. Democracies, for centuries now, have always provided citizens with reasonable means to verify that key constitutional rights were not widely abused. When I go to vote, I do not simply have the right that my vote be secret and fairly counted, but I rely on a good number of other citizens, randomly selected or with conflicting interests, which prevent the bad guys to put in place large scale abuses of such rights. There are also a number of process regulations, such as recounts, that further prevent such frauds.
In fact, in order to provide such concrete control over telematics, server rooms (or “cages”) hosting a such “free” telematic service could be physically managed applying those same (or enhanced) physical security provisions that are currently applied to ballot boxes during an election. In practice, physical access to such servers would be enabled only while a few randomly selected or elected users (or citizens) are physically present. For a more detail explanation on how that may be accomplished, see our proposed hosting requirements for such service
According to this model of telematic service provisioning, anyone could deploy a “free” telematic services, by developing new software or freely installing or extending any publicly available FLOSS software, and running those according to such hosting requirements.
Anyone can do this, without breaching any FLOSS license, by requiring the signing of a copyright assignment, or similar statement, whenever users, or anyone, wants to access the software source code.
For more info on how set up such “free” telematics service, see our draft Service Access Policies at Plonegroups.org
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